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The EMSs approach to macroeconomics introduces strategic interactions and en-
dogenous entry decisions in the analysis of aggregate phenomena. This approach
departs from the perfectly competitive environment, in the sense that ￿rms do not
take prices as given, but they do choose their entry and production strategies and
they interact strategically. In general equilibrium, this leads to novel implications for
the mechanism of propagation of aggregate shocks, for the theory of the gains from
trade and for the sources of the growth process. We introduce this emerging literature
and discuss some of its implications.
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1The endogenous market structures (EMSs) approach to macroeconomics in-
troduces strategic interactions and endogenous entry decisions in the analysis of
aggregate phenomena as business cycle, international trade and growth. There-
fore, this approach departs from the perfectly competitive environment, in the
sense that ￿rms do not take prices as given, but they do choose their entry and
production strategies and they interact strategically. In general equilibrium,
this leads to novel implications for the mechanism of propagation of supply and
demand shocks, for the theory of the gains from trade and for the sources of the
growth process. We review this emerging literature through simple models and
discuss some of its implications.
The new ingredients of the EMSs approach to macroeconomics are on the
supply side of the economy. This approach focuses not only on the choice of
prices as the strategic variables, but also on the choice of output levels, and on
the choice of entry to produce new or better goods. In most of the analysis the
analysis adopts either symmetric Cournot competition or symmetric Bertrand
competition as the main models of static strategic interactions, but we will
occasionally introduce other forms of competition, as Stackelberg competition
or models of imperfect collusion, and we propose a general approach that can
be employed with more sophisticated competitive structures borrowed from re-
search in the ￿eld of industrial organization. As a matter of fact, one of the
main aims of the EMSs approach is exactly to build a solid bridge between
macroeconomics and industrial organization.
The technological conditions are characterized by positive ￿xed costs of en-
try so as to move beyond the constant returns to scale hypothesis. To a large
extent, we depart from the neoclassical assumption that investment (of ￿nal
goods) builds the physical capital that is used as factor of production together
with labor supplied by the working class. That was a good assumption to de-
scribe production in the industrialization phase, characterized by the dominance
of the secondary (manufacturing) sector and by the social con￿ict between cap-
ital and labor, but not such a good one to describe production in the modern
age, dominated by the tertiary (service) sector and by the New Economy, where
ideas, innovations, intellectual property rights and creativity are the main in-
puts needed to create new products, and where the value of start ups without
any capital can be high because of these intangible inputs. For this reason,
we embrace a concept of investment (in terms of labor or consumption units)
needed to enter in the market with new products (or with better products) pro-
duced through labor. This establishes a two-way link between investment and
market structure: pro￿tability in the market attracts investment to create new
products, and the creation of new products by means of investment enhances
competition and reduces pro￿tability in the market.
Finally, we endogenize the entry decision of the ￿rms as a rational pro￿t
maximizing decision. The New-Keynesian literature has taken into consider-
ation the rational behavior of monopolistic ￿rms in the choice of their pro￿t
maximizing prices, but it has typically neglected the rational behavior of the
2same ￿rms in the choice of entering in the market if and only if positive pro￿ts
can be expected. As a consequence, in this literature there is no link between
pro￿t opportunities and production or any other aggregate variable. Our analy-
sis of the entry process leads to the ￿nal characterization of the EMSs.
In a sense, our approach can be seen as a natural evolution of the neoclassical
approach, which has been guided by the attempt of introducing rational behav-
ior in all the aspects of decision making. The rational theories of consumption
and labor supply and the theory of rational expectations (as opposed to adaptive
expectations) have been the building blocks of the neoclassical approach. How-
ever, a rational theory of entry in markets in which there are pro￿t-maximizing
strategic ￿rms has not been introduced until recently. Actually, there is an old
partial equilibrium literature which investigates the entry process on the basis
of an adaptive mechanism rather than a rational one. Suppose that gross prof-
its in a market with Nt ￿rms at time t are ￿(Nt), and that entry of Ne
t new
￿rms depends on the excess pro￿ts compared to a ￿xed cost F according to
Nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿N)(Nt + Ne
t ) with Ne
t = ￿[￿(Nt) ￿ F], where ￿N 2 (0;1) is a
rate of exit from the market and ￿ > 0 parametrizes the speed of entry. The
evolution of this system can exhibit monotonic or cyclical convergence to the
steady state, but complex dynamics can emerge as well. The exogenous and
adaptive nature of this process is its limit, which will be avoided by the EMSs
approach, where the number of entrants Ne
t derives from an endogenous and
rational process.
An EMS is de￿ned as an equilibrium organization of a market where each
￿rm chooses its own strategy to maximize pro￿ts taking as given the demand
conditions and the strategies of the other ￿rms, and where the number of ￿rms is
such that all of them make non-negative pro￿ts and further entry cannot provide
positive pro￿ts. We will often refer to a simpli￿ed situation with a symmetric
equilibrium in which all ￿rms choose the same strategy and they obtain the
same pro￿ts, and we will approximate the exact equilibrium assuming that the
number of ￿rms is a natural number. In such a case an EMS is de￿ned by a
pair (x;N) where x is the strategy adopted by each ￿rm and N is the number of
￿rms, and the equilibrium satis￿es the conditions for pro￿t maximization and
endogenous entry. Notice that the strategy can be given by the production level
of the ￿rms or by their prices in case of competition in the market respectively ￿ a
la Cournot or ￿ a la Bertrand, or by the investment in R&D in case of competition
for the market.
In general, in the presence of multiple markets, each market k is character-
ized by an EMS with (xk;Nk) and, in the presence of multiple periods, each
period t is characterized by EMSs for each market (xkt;Nkt) with associated dy-
namic paths for the equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium number of ￿rms.
These converge to steady state EMSs (~ xk; ~ Nk) that depend on structural (tech-
nological, behavioral, strategic and policy) factors and that can be interpreted
as the long run EMSs. The crucial aspect of substituting perfect competition
or exogenous market structures with EMSs in macroeconomics has to do with
3the link between demand and supply in general equilibrium. The demand func-
tions perceived by the ￿rms must be the result of the maximization of utility by
rational consumers (or by a representative consumer), whose income includes
both the remuneration of the factors of production and the eventual pro￿ts of
the ￿rms (that were zero in the neoclassical approach with perfect competition,
or constant in models with an exogenous number of monopolistic ￿rms). In a
dynamic model, the discounted value of the ￿rms’pro￿ts, represented by the
stock market capitalization, re￿ects both the strategic interactions and the en-
try/exit process and it a￿ects aggregate demand as well. Therefore, the EMSs
approach creates a novel and complex channel that links competition, the stock
market and the aggregate economy. We start by sketching a simple model with
a single market and a single period to introduce the reader to the main aspects
of the EMSs approach. Later on, we introduce a dynamic setup, and we provide
preliminary discussions about the role of EMSs in explaining the determinants
of the business cycle, the international trade between countries and the growth
process.
In the analysis of industrial organization there are well developed studies
on strategic interactions in the Cournotian tradition and on endogenous entry
in the presence of ￿xed costs of production in the Marshallian tradition. The
systematic adoption of both elements is more recent, but it is rapidly becoming
the standard way to model market structures. One of the ￿rst characterizations
of EMSs is due to Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), who studied competition in
quantities and cost reducing strategies with homogenous goods and free entry.
Only recently their results have been generalized to product di￿erentiation and
competition in prices by Vives (2008). However, the Dasgupta-Stiglitz model
has largely inspired the investigations of Sutton (1991, 1998, 2008), who has
analyzed markets with strategic interactions in the choice of production and
quality, endogenous entry and endogenous sunk costs from both a theoretical
and empirical point of view. The analysis of strategic investments and asym-
metries in the presence of EMSs has been introduced only recently, with the
￿rst general characterization of Stackelberg equilibria with endogenous entry
by Etro (2006, 2008,b).1
The modern empirical literature on EMSs started with the works of Bres-
nahan and Reiss (1987, 1990) and Berry (1992), which moved beyond the naive
view for which lower mark ups are due to more competition associated with a
larger number of ￿rms. Such a mechanism de￿nitely holds in the presence of
exogenous market structures, but when entry is endogenous there is an opposite
mechanism at work: lower mark ups attract a lower number of ￿rms and higher
mark ups attract a higher number of ￿rms. In general, the empirical analysis
of EMSs requires a di￿erent methodology. One possibility is an approach based
on the e￿ect that exogenous factors, as the size of demand or other technolog-
1For a comprehensive survey on the industrial organization literature on EMSs see Etro
(2007,a).
4ical conditions, have on the endogenous variables: mark ups, number of ￿rms
and production of these ￿rms. Berry and Reiss (2007) review empirical studies
within this approach, paying particular attention to equilibrium models that
interpret cross-sectional variation in the number of ￿rms or ￿rm turnover rates,
and to applications that analyze EMSs in airline, retail, professional, auction,
lodging, and broadcasting markets. A more recent approach is based on the im-
pact that entry conditions of di￿erent markets exert on the strategic behavior
of some ￿rms, and in particular on the leaders. When there are independent
variables (or natural experiments) that can discriminate between markets with
exogenous or endogenous entry, the predictions of the EMSs approach for the
behavior of the leaders can be tested.2
The introduction of EMSs in macroeconomic analysis is very recent, even
if the microeconomic tools have been available for a while. The microfounded
model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) has been widely used in the New-Keynesian
macroeconomic literature assuming monopolistic behavior by an exogenous num-
ber of ￿rms, therefore both strategic interactions and endogenous entry have
been systematically neglected. The trade literature has mainly focused on one
of the two aspects: endogenous entry of monopolistic ￿rms in general equilib-
rium (Krugman, 1980) or strategic interactions between an exogenous number of
￿rms in partial equilibrium (for instance Brander and Spencer, 1985). Growth
theory has endogenized entry in the competition in the market neglecting strate-
gic interactions (Romer, 1990) and has avoided any strategic consideration in
the analysis of the competition for the market (Aghion and Howitt, 2009).
A recent class of models has augmented all these frameworks with the intro-
duction of genuine EMSs, obtaining a number of new positive and normative
predictions that we will examine in the next chapters. A few early works on the
business cycle (summarized by Devereux et al., 1996 and Cooper, 1999) have in-
troduced monopolistic behavior and endogenous entry in each period within oth-
erwise standard neoclassical models. Other important works by Peretto (1996,
1999, 2003) have provided the ￿rst systematic attempt to introduce EMSs in
the competition in the market in a dynamic general equilibrium model of en-
dogenous growth, and to show the relevance of EMSs for the aggregate behavior
of the economy. Etro (2004) has provided the ￿rst attempt to introduce EMSs
in the competition for the market in a dynamic general equilibrium model of
Schumpeterian growth. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) have nested trade models
with monopolistic behavior and endogenous entry in a DSGE model of the open
economy, and this important contribution has opened new research opportuni-
ties to study EMSs in macroeconomics: see in particular Bilbiie et al. (2007,
2008a,b), Etro and Colciago (2007).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces strategic interac-
tions and endogenous entry in general models of competition in and for the
2For recent works within the ￿rst approach see Manuszak (2002), Campbell and Hopenhayn
(2005), Manuszak and Moul (2008) and Czarnitzki and Etro (2009). For the second approach
see Czarnitzki, Etro and Kraft (2008).
5market. Section 2 restricts the attention to microfounded pro￿t functions in
partial equilibrium focusing on competition in quantities and in prices with en-
dogenous entry. Section 3 studies the particular case of isoelastic utility which
will be adopted in multiple applications in the following chapters. Section 4 ap-
plies the EMSs approach to the simplest dynamic model, that is a two periods
exchange economy with endogenous entry in each period. Section 5 extends the
simple analysis to a general equilibrium context. Section 6 develops the ￿rst full
￿edged dynamic model with endogenous entry in the long run and characterizes
the equilibrium and steady state EMSs. This simple model allows us to derive
in Sections 7-9 preliminary implications for the analysis of business cycles, trade
and growth. Section 10 concludes.
1 EMSs in Partial Equilibrium
When we want to analyze the endogenous structure of a market the ￿rst step
is to characterize the pro￿t functions of the ￿rms active in this market and to
understand how these ￿rms interact strategically. The second step is to under-
stand which ￿rms are endogenously going to be active in this market and to
study how demand and supply conditions a￿ect entry and the strategies of the
￿rms. The third step is to understand how the aggregate demand conditions
have determined the pro￿t functions of the ￿rms under consideration, which
allows us to introduce the market under investigation in a microfounded frame-
work. The fourth step is to introduce this framework in a general equilibrium
context.
In this section we focus on the ￿rst two steps and we brie￿y introduce a
general class of models of the market structure (used already in the partial
equilibrium analysis of Etro, 2007,a) where the pro￿t functions are exogenously
given and the EMSs can be characterized in a general way. In the next section,
we will restrict our attention to a subset of this class of models where the pro￿t
functions are endogenously derived from the utility maximizing behavior of the
consumers.
Consider N ￿rms choosing a strategic variable x(i) > 0 with i = 1;2;:::;N.
These strategies deliver for each ￿rm i the gross pro￿t function:
￿(i) = ￿[x(i);￿i] (1)
where x(i) is the strategy of ￿rm i and we assume that gross pro￿ts have al-
ways a unique maximum in x(i): ￿1 R 0 for any x Q ^ x for some pro￿t max-
imizing strategy ^ x. The second argument represents the e￿ects (or spillovers)
induced by the strategies of the other ￿rms on ￿rm i’s pro￿ts, summarized by
￿i =
PN
j=1;j6=i h(x(j)) for some function h(x) which is assumed positive, dif-
ferentiable and increasing; these spillovers exert a negative e￿ect on pro￿ts,
￿2 < 0, and of course they a￿ect the pro￿t maximizing strategy. This general
framework nests models of competition with strategic substitutability (￿12 < 0),
6and with strategic complementarity (￿12 > 0). In the former case, typical of
Cournot competition, there may be multiple asymmetric equilibria (with ￿rms
choosing di￿erent strategies), and in the latter case, typical of Bertrand com-
petition, there may be multiple symmetric equilibria. Cooper and John (1988)
have emphasized the Keynesian implications of models with multiple equilibria
derived from strategic complementarities, but we will not stress this issue, and
we will focus on unique symmetric equilibria.
Finally, we assume that entry requires a ￿xed sunk cost F, so that the net
pro￿ts of ￿rm i are:
￿i = ￿[x(i);￿i] ￿ F
Given these pro￿t functions, under the standard assumption of Nash com-
petition between the ￿rms, we can easily characterize the symmetric EMS with
the pair (x;N) satisfying the pro￿t maximizing condition:
￿1 [x;(N ￿ 1)h(x)] = 0 (2)
and the endogenous entry condition:
￿[x;(N ￿ 1)h(x)] = F (3)
where we used the equilibrium condition ￿ = (N ￿ 1)h(x).
Such an EMS satis￿es a number of properties that are widely discussed in
Etro (2006, 2007,a). The main properties are the following. First, the number
of ￿rms N is always decreasing in the size of the ￿xed cost of entry (relative
to the size of the market).3 Second, the strategy of each ￿rm x is increasing
with the ￿xed cost of entry (relative to the size of the market) under strategic
substitutability, i.e. the ￿rm becomes more aggressive, and it is decreasing under
strategic complementarity, i.e. the ￿rm becomes more accommodating. Third,
any ￿rm would gain by committing, before entry occurs, to a more aggressive
strategy than x, which would reduce the endogenous number of ￿rms N. Fourth,
any ￿rm would also gain by committing to strategic investments that lead to a
more aggressive behavior than x, which would reduce the endogenous number
of ￿rms N.
Most of the common models of competition in the market, that is in the
choice of production or pricing for given products, are nested in our general
speci￿cation. For instance, consider a market with competition in quantities
such that the strategy x(i) represents the quantity produced by ￿rm i. The







decreasing in both arguments (if goods are substitutes). With a generic cost
function c(x(i)) with c0(￿) > 0, it follows that the gross pro￿ts for ￿rm i are:
￿(i) = x(i)p[x(i);￿i] ￿ c(x(i)) (4)
3Notice that the size of the ￿xed cost must be compared to the size of the market, which
determines the pro￿t opportunities, therefore we can think of F as a the ￿xed cost relative
to the market size. In other words, if gross pro￿ts were ￿(i) = E￿[x(i);￿i] with E as a size
parameter, the comparative statics of F would be the same as that of F=E.
7with ￿i =
P
j6=i x(j). Examples include the cases of linear and hyperbolic
demands p(i) = E ￿
PN




for any i and given
the size parameter E, general isoelastic demand functions, and other common
cases.
Consider now models of competition in prices where p(i) is the price of ￿rm








D1 < 0, D2 < 0 and g0(p) < 0 is nested in our general framework after setting
xi ￿ 1=pi and h(x(i)) = g(1=x(i)). This speci￿cation guarantees that goods
are substitutes in a standard way since @Di=@p(j) = D2g0(p(j)) > 0. Examples
include models of price competition with isoelastic demand functions, Logit
demand, or any constant expenditure demand. Adopting, just for simplicity, a

















g(1=x(j)). This model is nested in our general framework as
well.
Notice that in a dynamic framework where entry costs F are born once
and the ￿rm remains active over time, the gross value of the ￿rm can be seen
as the discounted sum of its pro￿ts, something that should re￿ect the stock






and the endogenous entry condition equates this to the ￿xed cost of entry, so
that:
V (i) = F () ￿(i) = rF (7)
This dynamic framework can be easily extended with an exogenous probability
of exit from the market, for instance due to the introduction of a new and better
product.4
Models of competition for the market focus exactly on the competition to
innovate and associate the exit of the incumbent ￿rm with the introduction of
4In a discrete environment where ￿N 2 [0;1) is the exit rate in the presence of N ￿rms,
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(1 ￿ ￿N)￿(i)
r + ￿N







8a new and better product. These models are also known as patent races be-
cause they represent contests to obtain pro￿ts from intellectual property rights
associated with innovations (which typically provide a temporary monopolistic
power). Assume that ￿rms invest a ￿ow of resources in the continuous time to
obtain an innovation of exogenous value V M according to a stochastic process
￿ a la Poisson. If x(i) is the ￿ow of investment of ￿rm i determining an in-
stantaneous probability of innovation h(x(i)), which is assumed to be positive,
increasing and strictly concave, the gross value of ￿rm i can be derived as:
V (i) =





j=1 h(x(j)) is the instantaneous probability of innovation, which
corresponds to the rate of exit of the incumbent ￿rm (now endogenous). It is
easy to verify that this case is nested in our general framework after decomposing
the exit rate as ￿N = h(x(i))+￿i. Assuming again that the entry cost F is born
once and the ￿rms keep doing research until an innovation emerges, endogenous
entry must satisfy:
V (i) = F () rV (i) = h(x(i))V M ￿ ￿NV (i) ￿ x(i) (9)
whose second expression equates the return on the value of the ￿rm rV (i) =
rF with the expected net return from the R&D investment. This takes into
account the expected net gain from innovation h(x(i))
￿
V M ￿ V (i)
￿
￿x(i), and
the expected loss in case others innovate ￿iV (i).
In all these models, we can derive the EMSs and characterize the equilibrium
pair (x;N) as a function of the exogenous variables, which is a starting point
for comparative static analysis and for the study of the strategic behavior of
￿rms in a realistic market environment. This class of models has proved to
be quite useful to investigate a number of positive and normative issues at
the microeconomic level. Etro (2007,a) reviews the applications of the EMSs
approach to strategic investments in R&D, advertising, quality choices, product
di￿erentiation, debt ￿nancing and other ￿nancial decisions, dynamic forms of
competition, issues related to network e￿ects, bundling, vertical restraints, price
discrimination, mergers, collusion and liberalizations, and discusses the main
implications for antitrust policy.
Introducing EMSs in a macroeconomic framework, all of the above men-
tioned exogenous variables are going to be endogenized in the EMSs approach.
For instance, when we study competition in the market within dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium models of the aggregate economy, therefore the demand
functions derive from endogenous choices of utility maximizing agents (and pol-
icymakers as well), and the cost functions depend on the technology but also
on the equilibrium in the market for inputs. When we study open economies in
which decisions taken by ￿rms and consumers in the foreign markets (and by
9policymakers as well) a￿ect the pro￿t functions of the domestic ￿rms. When
we study models of competition for the market where the value of innovations
and the interest rate depend on the general equilibrium of the economy (and
by the action of policymakers once again), these elements a￿ect accordingly the
expected pro￿ts of the ￿rms investing in R&D.
Of course, a preliminary investigation of the EMSs in partial equilibrium
must be our next step, and we now proceed in this direction focusing on a
restricted class of static models of competition in the market whose demand
structure can be easily derived from consumers’ behavior.
2 Microfounded EMSs
In this section we follow the industrial organization literature and analyze a
single static market with multiple products characterized by a set of demand
functions that are directly derived from the optimal choices of a representative
agent with an exogenous endowment. All the ￿rms face common technological
conditions. Given these elements, we derive the EMSs in the case of competi-
tion in quantities and in prices in partial equilibrium. This framework will be
introduced in dynamic and general equilibrium macroeconomic models in later
sections.
Consider a representative agent with the following utility depending on the









where C(j) is consumption of good j, u(C) > 0, u0(C) > 0 with u00(C) ￿ 0,
and U(￿) is a positive and increasing function.6 Notice that these preferences
exhibit \love for variety", in the sense that spreading consumption through
a larger number of goods increases utility: this re￿ects complementarities in
consumption. The above utility is maximized under the budget constraint:
N X
j=1
p(j)C(j) = E (11)
where p(j) is the price of good j and E is the exogenous endowment of the
representative agent. In partial equilibrium this endowment is taken as given.
Utility maximization provides the demand for each good and allows us to analyze
competition in quantities or in prices.
5As well known, this speci￿cation is due to Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), whose results are com-
mented below. However, the original Dixit-Stiglitz model did not take into account strategic
interactions.
6Moreover, we assume the regularity condition u0(C) + Cu00(C) > 0.
102.1 EMSs with competition in quantities
Let us derive the inverse demand functions for the di￿erent goods. Utility max-
imization for each good i implies u0(C(i)) = ￿p(i) with ￿ Lagrange multiplier
of the budget constraint. Multiplying each side by C(i), summing up over all
goods and using the budget constraint, one obtains ￿ =
P
j C(j)u0(C(j))=E.
Therefore, if we de￿ne with x(i) the production of good i, its inverse demand






which is increasing in the endowment and decreasing in the production of each
good.7 Notice that with linear sub-utilities (u00(C) ! 0) we would obtain the
particular case of homogenous goods as a limiting outcome; namely, the inverse













which is nested in our general formulation (1) with ￿i =
P
j6=i x(j)u0(x(j)).
In case of Cournot competition between N ￿rms, each one chooses its own
output x(i) to maximize pro￿ts given the strategies of the other ￿rms, and in
the symmetric equilibrium one can derive the following output per ￿rm:
x =
(N ￿ 1)[u0(x) + xu00(x)]E
N2u0(x)c
which generates the following price:
p = ￿Q(N;x)c with ￿Q(N;x) =
Nu0(x)
(N ￿ 1)[u0(x) + xu00(x)]
(14)
where the index Q stands for competition in quantities. The mark up rule
is decreasing in the number of ￿rms, but in general it also depends on the
individual production x, and we assume that it is non-decreasing in x.8 Budget
balance requires x = E=Np, or ￿Q(N) = E=cNx, which together with (14)
uniquely de￿nes the mark up as a decreasing function of the number of ￿rms
￿Q(N). Moreover, for a given number of ￿rms, the mark up is non-increasing
in the marginal cost c, and non-decreasing in the endowment E.
7This holds under our restrictions on the sub-utilities.
8This turns out to be true under weak conditions on the preferences.
11The equilibrium gross pro￿ts become the following decreasing function of
the number of ￿rms:
￿(N) =
[u0(x) ￿ (N ￿ 1)xu00(x)]E
N2u0(x)
(15)
Now, let us use the fact that there is a ￿xed cost of entry in the market F.
Then, when entry is endogenous, the number of ￿rms must be such that these

















The pro￿t maximizing condition (14) and the endogenous entry condition
(16) together provide the equilibrium value for the pair (xQ;NQ), and there-
fore fully characterize the EMS in partial equilibrium. In this general case the
analysis of the comparative statics is complex, but a special case can help us to
derive a few basic results.
Consider the case of homogenous goods, corresponding to the limiting case
of linear sub-utilities (u00(x) = 0). Now the mark up boils down to ￿Q(N) =
N=(N ￿ 1), which is decreasing in the number of ￿rms (and independent from
marginal costs and endowment), but always larger than one. This allow us to
consider the e￿ect of strategic interactions in an otherwise standard setup with
perfectly substitutable goods (which has been traditionally studied only under
perfect competition in the neoclassical tradition of macroeconomics). Under















This relations show the simple link between the endowment of the representative
agent and the cost of entry on one side, and the EMS on the other side.9 We can
easily verify that increasing the size of a market the number of ￿rms increases
but less than proportionally, and the mark up decreases. More precisely, the
entry of at least N ￿rms requires an endowment above the minimum level N2F:
9Only when the ￿xed costs of production tend to zero, the market structure approximates
the perfectly competitive one, with in￿nite ￿rms producing an in￿nitesimal amount of the
uniform good at a price equal to the marginal cost.
12in other words, if we want to double the number of active ￿rms, we need an
endowment that is more than the double.10






This happens because a larger expenditure opens space for a larger number
of ￿rms, but this strengthens competition and reduces the mark ups, which
requires a larger scale of production for each ￿rm to cover the ￿xed costs.11
In conclusion, notice that one could study alternative models of competition in
quantities, as the Stackelberg model, in which one ￿rm is the leader and has a
￿rst mover advantage in the choice of its production level. We will analyze this
case later on.
2.2 EMSs with competition in prices
The utility maximization problem can be used also to express the direct demand
functions. This allows us to analyze the case of competition in prices. In
particular, inverting the utility maximizing condition u0(C(i)) = ￿p(i) we have
C(i) = u0￿1 [￿p(i)], which must be decreasing in ￿p(i) by the concavity of
the subutility function. Using our expression for the Lagrange multiplier ￿ = P













which is increasing in the endowment, decreasing in p(i) and increasing in the
other prices. Gross pro￿ts become:











which are nested in our general formulation (1) with ￿i =
P
j6=i u0￿1 [p(j)].
In a symmetric Bertrand equilibrium, all ￿rms choose a pro￿t maximizing
price:
p = ￿P(N)c with ￿P0(N) < 0 (21)
10Such a prediction can be generalized to models of competition in quantities with imperfect
competition, but not to models of competition in prices. It can be tested in the presence of
markets of di￿erent sizes, for instance professional or retail markets in di￿erent towns. A wide
empirical literature (Breshnan and Reiss, 1987; Manuszak, 2002; Czarnitzki and Etro, 2009)
has found encouraging support for this view.
11This prediction holds in more general models of competition in quantities and prices as
well. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) provide convincing empirical evidence in its support.
13where ￿P(N) is an implicit expression for the mark up (which may depend on
marginal cost and endowment). Notice that budget balance requires a demand









Under endogenous entry, the number of ￿rms must be such that these pro￿ts









The pro￿t maximizing and endogenous entry conditions (21) and (23) provide
together the equilibrium values for the pair (p;NP), and therefore fully describe
the EMS under symmetric competition in prices. Also in this case, generality
does not allow us to obtain simple comparative statics results, but the example
of the next section will clarify the relation between exogenous and endogenous
variables. Finally, notice that also in case of competition in prices one could
study the role of a leader within a Stackelberg model, as we will do in the
example of the next section. However, before focusing on this example, we need
to derive the optimal market structure in this general model.
2.3 Optimal EMSs
In their pathbreaking work on monopolistic pricing with product di￿erentiation
and free entry, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) characterized the (constrained) optimal
market structure.12 This is given by a common production level xO for each
￿rm and by the number of ￿rms NO that maximize utility U = U [Nu(x)]
subject to the zero pro￿t constraint x(p￿c) = F and to the resource constraint









where ￿(x) ￿ u0(x)x=u(x) is the elasticity of the subutilities (notice that, con-
trary to the case of EMSs, the optimal production per ￿rm is independent from
the total endowment). Of course this is only an implicit expression unless the
12The constraint refers to the zero pro￿ts of the ￿rms. The unconstrained ￿rst best would
adopt marginal cost pricing to maximize utility under the resource constraint.









which is linear in the endowment. Comparing this with (23), one can notice
that the optimal market structure is compatible with a mark up ￿O = 1=￿(xO).
Therefore, the EMS under competition in prices is e￿cient if and only if the
equilibrium mark up happens to coincide with the inverse of the elasticity of
the utility function.
In the next section, we will explore a particular case of our model in which
sub-utilities are isoelastic. In this case the equilibrium mark up in the short run
(i.e. with exogenous entry) is higher than the optimal one under both forms
of competition, and depends on the number of ￿rms and on the degree of sub-
stitutability between goods, but not on the marginal cost and the endowment.
This simpli￿es things at the cost of loosing (in the short run, but not in the
long run) the impact of supply and demand conditions on mark ups. Future
research should try to take into account more general preferences that deliver
richer short-run interactions between supply and demand conditions and mark
ups.
3 EMSs with Isoelastic Sub-utility
Let us simplify our analysis by introducing isoelastic subutilities. Assume that















where ￿ > 1 is the degree of substitutability between goods. When ￿ ! 1
the goods become perfect substitutes and generate a hyperbolic demand, when
￿ ! 1 they tend to complete independence. Of course, intermediate values of ￿
are associated with imperfect substitutability.
Notice that the elasticity of the sub-utility is ￿(x) = u0(x)x=u(x) = (￿￿1)=￿,
which is constant. Using the results of the previous section, this allows us to






The optimal number of ￿rms can be obtained if the ￿rms adopt a mark up





15which are both independent from the endowment. Incidentally, this is exactly
what would emerge if ￿rms were behaving as monopolistic price setters (as
in Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), ignoring the impact of their choices on the price
index.13 However, our interest here, is not on the monopolistic behavior of an
in￿nity of ￿rms, but on strategic interactions between a limited number of ￿rms
active in the market.
To microfound the pro￿t function, notice that the representative consumer
allocates its endowment E across the available goods with prices p(i) according










P1￿￿ i = 1;2;:::;N (28)












such that total expenditure satis￿es E =
PN
j=1 p(j)C(j) = CP.










i = 1;2;:::;N (30)
where x(i) is the consumption of good i.
In the following sections we analyze di￿erent forms of competition that can
take place between the ￿rms and derive the associated EMSs.
3.1 Cournot competition
First, let us consider competition in quantities. Using the inverse demand func-
tion, we can express the pro￿t function of a ￿rm i as a function of its output
x(i) and the output of all the other ￿rms:











13Of course, this would be a reasonable assumption in the presence of an in￿nity (or a
very high number) of ￿rms selling di￿erent varieties of the same good - by the way, this is a
situation at odds with the same concept of monopolistic behavior.
16Assume now that each ￿rm chooses its production x(i) taking as given the
production of the other ￿rms. The ￿rst order conditions can be simpli￿ed
imposing symmetry of the Cournot equilibrium. This generates the individual
output:
x =
(￿ ￿ 1)(N ￿ 1)E
￿N2c
(32)
Substituting into the inverse price, one obtains the equilibrium price p = c￿N=(￿￿
1)(N ￿ 1), which is associated with the equilibrium mark up:
￿Q(￿;N) =
￿N
(￿ ￿ 1)(N ￿ 1)
(33)
which is a particular case of (14). Notice that the mark up is decreasing in the
degree of substitutability between products ￿, with an elasticity ￿
Q
￿ = 1=(￿ ￿ 1).
As long as the number of ￿rms is ￿nite, the markup remains positive for any
degree of substitutability. Finally, the mark up is decreasing and convex in
the number of ￿rms and it tends to ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) > 1 for N ! 1. Its elasticity
is ￿
Q
N = 1=(N ￿ 1), which is decreasing in the number of ￿rms (the mark up
decreases with entry at an increasing rate) and independent from the degree of
substitutability between goods.
Gross pro￿ts can be expressed as:
￿Q(￿;N) =
(N + ￿ ￿ 1)E
￿N2 (34)
If the ￿xed cost of entry is F, entry will take place and will reduce the
individual pro￿ts as long as the gross pro￿ts are higher than this ￿xed cost. In












which is larger than the optimal number (26). This excessive entry result gen-
eralizes to a wider context (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986) and has also found
some empirical evidence.14 Moreover, the equilibrium number of ￿rms increases
in a less than proportional way with the size of the market (E=F), contrary
to what happens in the case of monopolistic behavior of each ￿rm (or in the
optimal market structure). Larger markets induce stronger competition, as can









E2 + 4￿(￿ ￿ 1)FE
!￿1
(36)
14Berry and Waldfogel (1999) have investigated EMSs in radio broadcasting, providing
evidence that entry is systematically above the optimal level.
17which is decreasing in ratio E=F. This implies that the size of a market has to
more than double to allow the entry of a double number of ￿rms. Nevertheless,
comparing this EMS with the (constrained) optimal market structure we can
conclude that competition in quantities leads to an excessive mark up and to
an excessive number of ￿rms.








E2 + 4￿(￿ ￿ 1)FE
(37)
which is decreasing in the marginal cost of production and increasing and con-
cave in the endowment. The former result shows that positive cost shocks induce
a larger production by each ￿rm. The latter shows that positive demand shocks
(increasing the endowment of the consumers) increases the production of each
￿rm as well: this happens because each ￿rm has to produce more to cover the
same ￿xed costs at a lower mark up.
3.2 Bertrand competition
Let us now consider competition in prices. In each period, the gross pro￿ts of











Firms compete by choosing their prices. Contrary to the traditional Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) approach which neglects strategic interactions between ￿rms, we
take these into consideration and derive the exact Bertrand equilibrium. Each
￿rm i chooses the price p(i) to maximize pro￿ts taking as given the price of the
other ￿rms. The ￿rst order conditions can be simplie￿ed imposing symmetry:
￿
￿(p ￿ c)p￿￿￿1 ￿ p￿￿￿
Np￿(￿￿1) = (￿ ￿ 1)p￿￿ (p ￿ c)p￿￿
Solving for the equilibrium we have p = c(￿N ￿ ￿ + 1)=(￿ ￿ 1)(N ￿ 1), which
implies the following mark up:
￿P(￿;N) =
1 + ￿(N ￿ 1)
(￿ ￿ 1)(N ￿ 1)
The mark up under competition in prices is always smaller than the one obtained
before under competition in quantities, as well known for models of product
di￿erentiation. As in the previous case, the mark up is decreasing in the degree
of substitutability between products ￿, with an elasticity ￿P
￿ = ￿N=(1 ￿ ￿ +
￿N)(￿ ￿ 1) which is always higher than ￿
Q
￿ : higher substitutability reduces
18mark ups faster under competition in prices. Moreover, contrary to the case
of competition in quantities, the mark up under competition in prices vanishes
in case of homogenous goods lim￿!1 ￿P(￿;N) = 1, a well known result in
industrial organization. Finally, the mark up is again decreasing in the number
of ￿rms, with elasticity ￿P
N = N=[1 + ￿(N ￿ 1)](N ￿ 1), which is decreasing
in the level of substitutability between goods, and approaching zero when the
goods become homogenous.




1 + ￿(N ￿ 1)
(39)
Given total expenditure, the number of ￿rms and the degree of substitutability,
it is easy to verify that the pro￿ts under competition in prices are smaller than
those under competition in quantities.
If the ￿xed cost of entry is F, the endogenous entry condition that sets net








which is linearly increasing in the endowment and decreasing in the ￿xed cost
of entry. The corresponding equilibrium markup is:
￿P(￿;NP) =
￿E
(￿ ￿ 1)(E ￿ F)
(41)
which is increasing in the ￿xed cost of entry and decreasing in the endowment.
Notice that, given the total expenditure, the ￿xed costs and the degree of substi-
tutability, competition in prices generates a smaller number of ￿rms compared
to competition in quantities. Moreover, if we take the integer constraint (on
the number of ￿rms) into account, we can verify that the equilibrium number
of ￿rms can be above the (constrained) optimal number by at most one ￿rm.
Finally, one can easily verify that ￿Q(￿;NQ) is always bigger than ￿P(￿;NP),
which means that the EMSs under competition in quantities are characterized
by more ￿rms but they preserve higher prices than competition in prices:
NQ > NP and ￿Q(￿;NQ) > ￿P(￿;NP)
This shows that the index of concentration is a poor measure of the market
power as an expression of the ability of ￿rms to price above the marginal cost.
When entry is endogenous, low mark ups are consistent with high concentration
and vice versa.
Under competition in prices, the production of each ￿rm is:
xP =
F(￿ ￿ 1)(E ￿ F)
[E + (￿ ￿ 1)F]c
(42)
19which is decreasing in the marginal cost and increasing in the endowment, as it
was under competition in quantities. Therefore, cost and demand shocks a￿ect
the production of each ￿rm in similar ways.
In conclusion, these EMSs provide two main di￿erences compared to the case
of monopolistic ￿rms ￿ a la Dixit-Stiglitz: mark ups are reduced and individual
production is increased when the size of the market increases, while they are
constant in case of monopolistic ￿rms. Moreover, under competition in prices
the endogenous number of ￿rms increases linearly with the size of the market,
as in the case of monopolistic ￿rms ￿ a la Dixit-Stiglitz, but under competition
in quantities it increases in a less than proportional way.
3.3 Stackelberg competition
The EMSs can be used to study more complex forms of competition. In this
section we extend the symmetric models of competition in quantities and in
prices with the introduction of market leaders. In the industrial organization
jargon, these are ￿rms able to commit to their own strategies before the so-called
followers. Since many markets are characterized by the presence of incumbent
￿rms which typically have larger market shares than their rivals, taking them
into account allows us to obtain a more realistic picture of the EMSs. The model
of Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry has been introduced by Etro
(2008,b) in a static set up as the one considered until now.
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider ￿rst the case of competition in
quantities and homogeneous goods, that is ￿ ! 1. With one leader and N




which is lower compared to the mark up under pure Cournot competition. The
pro￿ts of the leader and the representative follower are respectively larger and
smaller than the pro￿ts under Cournot competition, but the impact of a change
in the number of ￿rms on the equilibrium mark up and production is qualita-
tively analogous to the Cournot case. Etro and Colciago (2007) employ also
this market structure in a dynamic macroeconomic model to examine the role
of market leaders over the business cycle.
Contrary to the case of an exogenous number of ￿rms, the static model of
Stackelberg competition with endogenous entry is characterized by a radically
di￿erent market structure with only one ￿rm active: actually, whenever the
goods are homogeneous and the marginal cost of production is constant, the










20which is higher than the one emerging in the absence of the leader, and the









Even if the EMS is radically di￿erent from the case of Cournot competition,
the endogeneity of entry leads to similar comparative statics: an increase in
the endowment or a reduction of the ￿xed cost of entry force the leader to
produce more and to keep the mark up lower. The main di￿erence compared
to the Cournot case is that here the leader obtains positive pro￿ts in spite of
free entry. In a recent important work, Kov￿ a￿ c, Vinogradov and ￿ Zigi￿ c (2009)
have extended the analysis to a dynamic setup: they analyze a oligopoly model
in which a leader invests in process innovations facing subsequent endogenous
entry by followers, and identify conditions under which it is optimal for the
leader in an initially oligopoly setup with endogenous entry to undertake pre-
emptive R&D investment (strategic predation) that eventually leads to the exit
of all followers.15
The radical result of entry deterrence disappears when we introduce sub-
stantial producct di￿erentiation, that is when ￿ is low enough. Consider the
general case of quantity leadership in the presence of imperfect substitutability.
The Stackelberg equilibrium with endogenous entry is characterized by a larger
production for the leader compared to the followers, and entry of a lower number
of ￿rms compared to the Cournot equilibrium with endogenous entry. The char-
acterization of the equilibrium is relatively simple, with the leader selling at the
monopolistic mark up, and with an endogenous number of followers adopting
the same production level as under symmetric competition in quantities and the
same mark up (36). Therefore, the equilibrium is summarized by the following
mark ups for the quantity leader (index L) and for the representative follower
15The technological leader adopts the accommodation strategy only when (roughly speak-
ing) his R&D e￿ciency is low or/and the size of the market is relatively small. In all other
cases, the leader opts for strategic predation aiming to achieve the monopoly position after
certain time T. During the predation period (up to T), the leader might be willing even to
incur losses in order to enjoy monopoly pro￿t from time T onward. Thus, unlike a static
game, in a fully dynamic model the costs of predation last only for a limited period and
have to be contrasted to the in￿nite stream of monopoly pro￿t afterwards. The time pattern
of R&D investment crucially depends on the equilibrium strategy. If accommodation is the
optimal strategy, then the leader chooses an R&D path which steadily increases over time
towards the unique steady-state value. When, on the other hand, strategic predation is the
optimal strategy, the leader ￿rst invests signi￿cantly in R&D in order to achieve the monopoly
position in time T. After all rivals are eliminated, the leader may continue to increase his
R&D investment as an unconstrained monopolist or to prevent the rivals from re-entering the
market. Nevertheless, this investment level is still higher than in the case of accommodation.
From a welfare point of view, the predation regime is optimal because it implies high R&D














E2 + 4￿(￿ ￿ 1)FE
!￿1
(45)
In spite of this asymmetric EMS due to the presence of a leader, the endogeneity
of entry leads to similar conclusions as before: a larger endowment or a lower
￿xed cost attract further entry of followers, increase their individual outputs
and reduce their mark ups, with a positive impact on total production.
Let us ￿nally consider the case of price leadership with imperfect substi-
tutability. Under competition in prices, the Stackelberg equilibrium with en-
dogenous entry is characterized by the leader committing to a lower mark up
compared to the followers. In particular, the leader adopts again the monopolis-
tic price, and the followers adopt the same price as under symmetric competition















This result is in striking contrast with the usual outcome under price leadership
and exogenous entry, for which leaders adopt higher prices than the followers to
relax competition. When entry is endogenous, the only way for the leaders to
obtain positive pro￿ts is to adopt an aggressive strategy. When the endowment
increases or the cost of entry decreases, more followers are attracted in the
market, and they reduce their mark ups and increase their production, while
the leader maintains the lowest price.
Notice that these results on the behavior of the market leaders have sub-
stantial implications for industrial policy, since they show that large market
shares by leading ￿rms can be the result of strong entry pressure rather than of
market power, and antitrust policy should be more concerned about verifying
the entry conditions in a market rather than associating large market shares
with dominant positions. A similar result emerges in case of competition for
the market, where incumbent leaders tend to invest more than their rivals only
when entry is endogenous: this leads to the conclusion that also the persistence
of leadership can be the consequence of strong entry pressure rather than of
market power.
3.4 Endogenous entry costs
Sutton (1991, 1998) has forcefully proposed the necessity of endogenizing the
￿xed costs of entry in the analysis of EMSs. Following these contributions, Vives
(2008) has extended the class of models examined in the previous sections to
endogenous costs assuming that the ￿xed cost of production is an investment
22in R&D aimed at reducing the marginal cost of production. In general, he ￿nds
that increasing the endowment increases the investment in cost reduction and
the output of each ￿rm, but with ambiguous consequences on the number of
￿rms.
For instance, consider our case of isoelastic preferences with an isoelastic
cost function. In such a case a larger market size is associated with such a
larger ￿xed investment in cost reductions that the endogenous number of ￿rms
remains the same. This result for the case of competition in quantities and
homogenous goods is originally due to Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). They
assume that demand is hyperbolic and that the marginal cost depends on the
￿xed R&D investment F as in:
c = {F￿% with {;% > 0
The Nash equilibrium in the choice of output and R&D investment with en-




Therefore, in equilibrium, the number of ￿rms is:
NQ = 1 + 1=% (47)
the mark up (on the endogenous marginal cost) is:
￿Q = 1 + % (48)









Notice that the number of ￿rms and the mark up are now independent from the
size of the market, but the individual production is still increasing in it. Similar
results emerge in the case of product di￿erentiation and also with competition
in prices. Finally, an increase in the degree of product substitutability increases
per-￿rm output and cost reduction expenditure, while reducing the number of
￿rms as a consequence of the stronger competition.
3.5 Imperfect collusion
The framework that we adopted is tractable enough to take into account other
forms of competition. We could adopt the conjectural variations approach to
introduce imperfect collusion in a stylized way: in such a case, each ￿rm adopts
an exogenous conjecture on the reaction of the other ￿rms to its strategy, and
23this conjecture can reproduce competitive and collusive equilibria or any inter-
mediate case (including Cournot equilibria).
We could also analyze multiproduct ￿rms which choose the production levels
or the price levels of their goods to maximize the joint pro￿ts. All these and
other models would lead to equilibria with mark ups ￿(￿;N) and pro￿ts ￿(￿;N)
decreasing in the number of ￿rms, and therefore to well de￿ned EMSs. Notice
that from an empirical perspective, one could be interested in estimating these
mark up and pro￿t functions as depending on the number of ￿rms in di￿erent
markets (de￿ned according to the degree of substitutability between products).
Until now, we have limited our analysis to the case in which each ￿rm is
active for a single period only. A more realistic situation emerges when each
￿rm is active in multiple periods, or has always a positive probability of being
active in the future. In the absence of credible commitments to future strategies,
we can assume that in each period the existing ￿rms compete according to one
of our static models. In such a case, the gross value of the ￿rms would be
the present discounted value of the future pro￿ts and endogenous entry would
still require equalization of the initial ￿xed costs of entry to the gross stock
market value of the same ￿rm. This creates a dynamic behavior of the number
of ￿rms that is re￿ected on the equilibrium mark ups and, through them, on the
aggregate behavior of the macroeconomy. Starting with Section 6 we will extend
our analysis in this direction studying dynamic market structures. We need to
notice that a multi-period framework would allow one to study dynamic models
of market competition in which ￿rms can commit to multi-period strategies
or in which forms of imperfect collusion can be sustained as subgame perfect
equilibria of supergames (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992).
However, before moving to a fully dynamic analysis, we still need to extend
our basic framework to account for two important aspects: intertemporal links
between markets and general equilibrium considerations. The next section ex-
tends the static analysis of EMSs to the simplest dynamic situation, that is the
one characterized by two periods only. This allows us to appreciate the potential
role of EMSs in a dynamic framework.
4 EMSs in a Two Period Economy
In this section we follow an example by Etro (2007,a) of a two-period economy
where an exogenous endowment is allocated between current and future con-
sumption. Imperfect competition and endogenous entry in the goods market of
both periods generates a novel link between exogenous shocks and real choices
which works through the impact on the endogenous mark ups.
Consider a two period model of an exchange economy with logarithmic subu-
tilities:
U = logC1 + ￿logC2 (50)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor. The consumption good is homogenous
24and it is produced by multiple ￿rms in each period, so that the consumption
index boils down to Ct =
PNt
j=1 Ct(j) for t = 1;2. Firms compete in quantities.
The interest rate r and the endowment of the agent E are assumed exogenous
for simplicity. One can think of this as a small open economy facing a given
international interest rate.








Utility maximization requires the demand of consumption C1 = E=(1+￿)p1 in
the ￿rst period and C2 = ￿(1 + r)E=(1 + ￿)p2 in the second one, which imply







In each period, Nt ￿rms compete in quantities producing at a marginal cost
ct. For simplicity, assume (1 + r)￿ = 1 in what follows. De￿ning xt(i) as the







In Cournot equilibrium, each ￿rm produces xt(i) = E(Nt ￿1)=(1+￿)N2
t ct,





which is decreasing in the number of competitors. Therefore, we obtain the







The traditional outcome of perfect competition emerges in case of constant
returns to scale, here equivalent to the absence of ￿xed costs of production.
In such a case, endogenous entry implies an in￿nite number of ￿rms, prices are
equal to the marginal cost in both periods, and relative consumption is linked to
the ratio of marginal costs only: C2=C1 = c1=c2. Of course, under constant tech-
nology we have consumption smoothing (C2=C1 = 1). The neoclassical theory
of the business cycle is largely based on this mechanism: a permanent increase
in productivity does not a￿ect the relative marginal cost and consumption, but
a temporary increase in productivity (a reduction in c1=c2) induces an increase
in relative consumption (a decline of C2=C1). Finally, notice that an exogenous
change of the endowment does not a￿ect prices and relative consumption.
25When the markets are characterized by positive ￿xed costs of production,
however, only few ￿rms can be active and entry strongly a￿ects relative prices
and consumption. As a preliminary example, imagine that the ￿xed cost of














This result shows that an increase in the endowment (or a reduction in the
￿xed cost of production) increases the number of ￿rms and reduces the markups.















This shows two mechanisms due to the endogeneity of the market structures
(and completely absent under perfect competition). The ￿rst is rather straight-
forward: an increase in the ￿xed cost of entry in one period increases the relative
consumption in the other period, and vice versa. In particular, a reduction in
the future costs of entry leads to consumption growth: for instance, the intro-
duction of a general purpose technology that is going to reduce entry costs (say
cloud computing) should exert a positive impact on growth.
The second mechanism is less intuitive: an exogenous increase in the en-
dowment increases the relative consumption of the good produced by a lower
number of ￿rms. Suppose F1 > F2, which implies that more ￿rms are active in
the second period and p1=c1 > p2=c2: under these circumstances, an increase in
E increases C1 relative to C2.
Assume now that the ￿xed cost of production is related to the marginal cost
Ft = ￿ct, as it typically happens when both ￿xed and variable costs require
the same combination of inputs (for instance just labor). In such a case, we
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(1 + ￿)￿ ￿ c1
#
(54)
one can notice that a reduction in the marginal cost of the ￿rst period is going
to increase relative consumption in the ￿rst period more than proportionally.
This new propagation mechanism works through endogenous entry. A tempo-
rary shock reduces the marginal cost, which makes current consumption more
attractive. Moreover, the reduction in the entry costs induces more ￿rms to
26enter in the market, temporarily increasing competition. This induces a tem-
porary reduction in the equilibrium mark up, which exhibits countercyclicality.
Accordingly, the shock makes current consumption even more attractive.
In conclusion, in the presence of EMSs characterized by competition in quan-
tities and endogenous entry, the impact of a temporary productivity shock on
consumption is magni￿ed through the impact of entry on the mark up. No-
tice that the result would be a￿ected by changes in the degree of intertemporal
substitution (assuming a utility function with a higher elasticity of substitution
than the logarithmic one, the impact of the temporary shock on the relative
consumption in the ￿rst period would be strengthened).
Moreover, if we introduce endogenous labor supply, a temporary produc-
tivity shock would generate a standard intertemporal substitution mechanism
in the labor choice. This would be magni￿ed through the competition e￿ect:
a temporary productivity shock would induce a temporary increase in the real
wage, which would generate higher labor supply in the short run. In other words,
the EMSs create an additional channel through which traditional intertemporal
substitution mechanisms (in consumption and labor supply) work.
Finally, the model could be extended to imperfect substitutability between
goods produced by di￿erent ￿rms introducing a separate consumption index as

























and examining competition in quantities and prices. While the mark up rules
would change, the same logic of the results above would go through, because
the modi￿ed Euler equation (52) still holds.
Summarizing, our outcome is dependent on two di￿erences from the standard
neoclassical set up. The ￿rst is the departure from the assumption of constant
returns to scale: ￿xed costs of entry imply increasing returns to scale in the
production function. The second di￿erence relies on the form of competition:
here we adopted standard competition in quantities, but more general models
of strategic interaction as those examined in the previous sections would deliver
analogous results.
Before turning to more complicated dynamic extensions, we still need to in-
troduce our tractable static model in a general equilibrium framework to com-
plete our overview of the EMSs approach. We will do this in the simplest
possible way in the next section.
5 EMSs in General Equilibrium
General equilibrium analysis concerns multiple markets interacting between each
other. Most of the literature on general equilibrium has been focused on the case
27of perfectly competitive markets with price-taking ￿rms and without ￿xed costs
of production or entry. Only limited e￿orts have been dedicated to the analysis
of markets with imperfect competition or with strategic interactions between few
agents - see Bonanno (1990) and Mas Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, Ch.
18). Even this literature has been mostly aimed at providing non-cooperative
foundations of Walrasian equilibria studying the strategic behavior of the agents
(rather than the ￿rms), verifying the limit properties of the equilibria when the
number of agents increases, and deriving conditions for existence, uniqueness
and stability of the equilibria. Moreover, it has systematically neglected the
role of ￿xed costs of productions or other technological non-convexities in en-
dogenizing entry of ￿rms in the markets.
In our view, general equilibrium theory should try to provide a deeper un-
derstanding of aggregate phenomena in the presence of strategic interactions
(of di￿erent kinds) between ￿rms and with endogenous entry in each market.
The aim of this section is not to provide such a full-￿edged analysis of EMSs in
general equilibrium, but to introduce the simplest general equilibrium extension
of our partial equilibrium static model. This example will be generalized in the
next section.
Imagine that ￿rms produce the goods employing labor only, which in turn
is supplied in ￿xed quantity. One unit of labor produces A units of good.
Moreover, the ￿xed cost of creation of a new ￿rm corresponds to the cost of
￿=A units of labor, where ￿ > 0. The nominal unit wage is W.
The representative agent provides L units of labor and maximizes the same
utility as in (25) under the same budget constraint (11). However, the endow-
ment E is now endogenous and it depends on labor income and, using the fact
that the representative agent is the only shareholder of all the ￿rms, it depends
on net pro￿ts too. Summing up, the endogenous endowment becomes:










This allows us to derive the demand function for each good as a function of both
labor income and the pro￿ts of the same ￿rms. Therefore, the individual pro￿ts
of each ￿rm depend on the aggregate pro￿ts as well, and so on in a circular way.
However, assuming that the ￿rms take aggregate pro￿ts as given, competition
takes place as before and the aggregate pro￿ts amount to zero under endogenous
entry.16 Accordingly, the endogenous endowment simpli￿es to E = WL.
Using this, one can express the EMS in general equilibrium as a function of
total labor supply and of the ￿xed cost parameter. For instance, in the case of
homogenous goods and competition in quantities we have a general equilibrium
16This is not the case with asymmetric forms of competition. For instance, under Stackel-
berg competition, there are positive pro￿ts for the industry leaders even if there is endogenous
entry of followers. These pro￿ts should be taken into account in the demand functions.















Both the two markets of this economy, the one for the goods and the one for
labor, are in equilibrium, and this allows us to examine the new general equi-
librium e￿ect that EMSs create in the labor market. Adopting the price of the









This shows that the real wage is increasing in the aggregate productivity, de-
creasing in the size of the ￿xed cost, and increasing in the total labor supply.
The ￿rst comparative static result is standard, and the wage is lower than the
marginal productivity because of market power. The last two results derive from
the impact of endogenous entry on competition in general equilibrium: larger
markets or lower ￿xed costs attract entry, which in turn strengthens competi-
tion, reduces the mark ups and shifts resources from extra pro￿ts toward labor
remuneration. These general equilibrium EMSs can be easily extended to the
case of product di￿erentiation with competition in quantities with similar im-
plications.









and the equilibrium markup is:
￿P =
￿AL
(￿ ￿ 1)(AL ￿ ￿)
(60)
Again, we cannot derive equilibrium prices without a normalization. However,
in case of product di￿erentiation, it is convenient to express the real wage as the
ratio between the nominal wage and the price index, which in the symmetric
equilibrium is P = pN1=(1￿￿). Therefore, the real wage becomes:
wP =











which is again a fraction of the aggregate productivity, and is decreasing in the
size of the entry cost, but increasing in the size of the labor force. Larger and
29more accessible markets attract entry, which reduces mark ups on one side and
increases the number of di￿erent varieties on the other side. Now, both e￿ects
increase the real wage: the former because it leads to a reduction in the average
price, the latter because it increases the purchasing power for a given income
(because of the love for variety e￿ect).
The competition e￿ect of market size and entry costs on mark ups and real
wages appears extremely simple and possibly trivial in such a static model with
a single market, but it will be at the source of a number of crucial results in
the presence of multiple markets or multiple periods, in particular when in-
tertemporal substitution mechanisms are available or when intra-industry trade
between countries occurs. Loosely speaking, the fundamental reason is that,
contrary to what happens in the neoclassical approach, here prices depend on
both the marginal cost of production and the mark up, and the latter is a￿ected
by shocks through the entry mechanism. In turn, the impact on the mark ups
is transmitted to the real wages through the general equilibrium mechanims
shown in this section, and any change in mark ups and wages has an impact
on consumption and labor supply choices. In turn, this feeds back on pro￿ts
and a￿ects the entry decisions and with them the mark ups and the real wages.
In such a way, the EMSs create a new mechanism of propagation of shocks in
general equilibrium.
As of now we have largely discussed microfounded EMSs in a static frame-
work in partial and general equilibrium and in a simple dynamic framework with
two periods only. It is time to approach a more ambitious task and to build a
fully dynamic general equilibrium model, which should give to the reader the
ultimate ￿avor of the EMSs approach to macroeconomics.
6 EMSs in an In￿nite Periods General Equilib-
rium Economy
In this section we provide an application of the EMSs approach to a dynamic
production economy with an in￿nite horizon both for the representative agent
and the ￿rms. These have to pay an initial ￿xed cost to enter in the market,
and subsequently they compete ￿ a la Cournot in the production of a homoge-
nous good. Production occurs with a single input, labor, which is inelastically
provided by the agent, and business creation is driven by savings, that are in-
elastically provided as well.
We adopt the simplifying assumption used by Solow (1956) for which sav-
ings are a constant fraction of income. However, in our model income includes
both the remuneration of inputs and the pro￿ts. This allows us to obtain a
dynamic model in which it is not investment in physical capital to generate the
accumulation of the reproducible input over time, as in the neoclassical Solow
model, but it is entry of new ￿rms to generate the creation of new productive
30business.
Since entry strengthens competition, it also induces a sort of decreasing mar-
ginal productivity of business creation, just like capital accumulation reduces
the marginal productivity of capital in the neoclassical model. Here, however,
it is entry that strengthens competition and reduces the marginal pro￿tability
of subsequent entry. Therefore, both models generate a gradual convergence
toward a steady state: in the Solow case through a decreasing growth rate of
the capital stock, in our case through a decreasing rate of business creation.
6.1 A model of business creation with Cournot competi-
tion
Consider a representative market for a homogenous good with Nt ￿rms active
in each period t. Each ￿rm i produces xt(i) according to a linear production
function:
xt(i) = Atli (62)
where At is the exogenous productivity of labor (or the total factor productivity
in this case without other inputs), which is common to all ￿rms, and li is the
labor input used by ￿rm i. Given the nominal wage Wt, the constant marginal
cost of production is ct = Wt=At. Total expenditure in the sector is:
Et = ptCt = pt
PNt
j=1 xt(j)
where pt is the equilibrium price equating consumption demand Ct, for the
moment taken as given, and supply by all the ￿rms in period t. Nominal pro￿ts

















We assume that the ￿rms cannot credibly commit to future production
strategies, therefore they play Cournot competition in each period. If at time
t ￿rm i chooses its production xt(i) to maximize its pro￿ts taking as given
the production of the other ￿rms, the equilibrium generates individual output
xt = (Nt ￿ 1)EtAt=WtN2










which is associated with the usual equilibrium mark up ￿(Nt) = Nt=(Nt ￿ 1).
This equilibrium generates individual pro￿ts ￿t(Nt) = Et=N2
t in nominal terms.
31Since the equilibrium price of the consumption good is pt, it is convenient to
express all the variables in units of consumption, that is in real terms (alter-
natively one can use the consumption good as the numeraire). Then, the real












This implies that each ￿rm produces xt = (Nt ￿ 1)CtAt=wtN2
t = Ct=Nt.
When the number of ￿rms increases, the equilibrium price goes down and
the wage goes up, with the former approaching the marginal cost and the latter
approaching the productivity of labor for Nt ! 1. However, here we do not
want to approach the neoclassical paradigma with in￿nite ￿rms, but we want to
endogenize the number of ￿rms. One way to do it is to assume, as usual, that
there is a ￿xed cost of production in each period and that free entry occurs at
all times (this is the approach of Cooper, 1999 and Jaimovich and Floetotto,
2008). Such an assumption, however, would exclude any interesting dynamic
in our model, because pro￿ts would be zero at any time. Another way to
endogenize entry, which is more realistic and interesting for dynamic models, is
to assume that entry is constrained by the expectations on future pro￿tability
and by a one-shot ￿xed cost of entry. This is the approach that we will adopt
from now on.
In every period Ne
t new ￿rms enter in the market, and a fraction ￿N 2
(0;1) of the (old and new) ￿rms exits from the market for exogenous reasons.
Therefore, the number of ￿rms follows the equation of motion:
Nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿N)(Nt + Ne
t ) (66)
which is analogous to the equation of motion of capital in the Solow model.17
The real gross value of a new ￿rm Vt is the present discounted value of its
future expected pro￿ts, which, using the expectations operator E[￿], and taking
into account the exit probability in each period, becomes:
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17This equation of motion for the number of ￿rms is borrowed from Ghironi and Melitz
(2005). Analogous results would emerge with a more traditional version as Nt+1 = (1 ￿
￿N)Nt + Ne
t , in which new ￿rms are always active for at least one period.
32where rt+k is the real interest rate at time t + k, whose expectation is taken as
given by the ￿rms, and the second line rearranges the ￿rst one in a recursive
form. In each period entry occurs until the real value of the representative ￿rm
equates the ￿xed cost of entry.
Since all ￿rms produce the same homogenous good, it is reasonable to as-
sume that entry of a new ￿rm requires only an extra labor activity to prepare
production (rather than a speci￿c monetary investment in R&D to create a new
or better product), therefore we assume that the ￿xed cost of entry Ft is equal
to ￿=At units of labor, where ￿ > 0. Given the wage wt = (Nt ￿ 1)At=Nt, the
endogenous entry condition Vt = Ft amounts to:




Investment is destined to the creation of new ￿rms. Given the ￿xed costs of
entry Ft and the number of entrants Ne







where we used the endogenous entry condition.
Assume that the number of workers is given by Lt and each one supplies a
unit of labor in each period. Real income in each period must be the sum of
pro￿ts and labor income in real terms:




This income must be allocated between consumption Ct and savings St in each
period.
The market clearing condition that equates savings and investments in every
period links the equilibrium number of active ￿rms to the equilibrium interest
rate in each period. Therefore, the interest rate depends on the stock market
evaluation of the return on the investment in business creation, which depends
on the strategic interactions between ￿rms and on the entry/exit process. Fi-
nally, total labor demand equates the exogenous labor supply in each period.
To close the model we need to introduce a consumption function. Following
the standard approach of Solow (1956) we assume that savings are an exogenous
fraction s 2 (0;1) of income, St = sYt. From the aggregate resource constraint
















Nt ￿ (1 ￿ s)
(69)
which is an increasing function of productivity and labor force, but also of the
number of ￿rms and of the propensity to consume (1￿s). The last e￿ects have a
Keynesian ￿avor, even if they operate on the supply side of the economy (rather
than on the demand side as for the traditional Keynesian multiplier). Given the
number of active ￿rms, a stronger propensity to consume increases aggregate
demand and total pro￿ts,18 which in turn increases total output. Of course, an
increase in the number of ￿rms strengthens competition and reduces the pro￿ts
while increasing labor income. However, as long as part of income is saved and
not consumed, the reduction in total pro￿ts is more than compensated by the
increase in labor income, so that more ￿rms lead to higher output.
Applying the equality of savings:
St = sYt =
s(Nt ￿ 1)AtLt
Nt ￿ (1 ￿ s)





￿ (Nt ￿ 1 + s)
Plugging the above expression in the equation of motion for Nt we have our
￿nal result for the evolution of the number of ￿rms:






Assume that the labor force is constant at the level L at each point in time,
and that the aggregate productivity is ￿xed at At = A. Then, the dynamic
adjustment of the number of ￿rms toward its steady state value resembles the
dynamic adjustment of capital in the Solow model toward zero growth.
From the dynamics of the number of ￿rms one can reconstruct the path of
all the other variables. Two remarks are in order. First, the value of the stock
market can be expressed as the value of all the ￿rms NtVt = ￿(Nt ￿ 1), which
follows the same dynamic path of Nt. For this reason, the aggregate behavior
of the economy (consumption and output) is strictly related to the behavior
of the stock market. Second, the model provides a dynamic path for income
18Total pro￿ts can be derived as:
Nt￿t(Nt) =
(1 ￿ s)(Nt ￿ 1)AtLt
Nt [Nt ￿ (1 ￿ s)]
which is increasing in productivity but decreasing in the number of ￿rms and in the savings
rate.
34distribution, because the labor share 1 ￿ ￿t is procyclical. This can be derived
from:






which is increasing in the savings rate and in the number of ￿rms (i.e.: the
fraction of income distributed as labor income is procyclical). Contrary to the
neoclassical approach, in which the labor share was constant (at least under
a standard Cobb-Douglas technology), the EMSs approach is able to generate
more complex dynamics for the distribution of income between capital remu-
neration (in the form of dividends) and labor income.
6.2 EMSs in the long run
Let us consider the stationary situation to characterize the long run EMSs. Since
the right hand side of (70) is increasing in the current number of ￿rms but with
a declining slope (smaller than one for a number of ￿rms large enough), we
can conclude that the dynamic path of the economy is stable around its unique
steady state. When the initial number of ￿rms is low, savings contribute to
create new ￿rms, but new ￿rms strengthen competition reducing the pro￿ts
and the incentives to enter. The steady state number of ￿rms can be derived
as:
~ N = 1 + s
￿




which is increasing in the savings rate s, in the productivity level A and in the
labor force L, and decreasing in the exit rate ￿N and in the relative size of the
￿xed costs ￿. The equilibrium endogenously generates imperfect competition
between a positive but limited number of ￿rms producing the homogenous good,
with a steady state mark up:
~ ￿ =
s(1 ￿ ￿N)AL + (1 ￿ s)￿￿N
s(1 ￿ ￿N)AL ￿ s￿￿N
(72)
which is characterized by the opposite comparative statics of the number of
￿rms.
Of course, the dynamic path of output and consumption (and of the real
wage and the interest rate) can be determined residually from the evolution of
the number of ￿rms. When the latter increases toward its steady state value,
output increases as well toward its steady state value:




This does not depend on the savings rate: a larger propensity to save increases
entry and the number of ￿rms, which enhances competition and wages, but
35decreases consumption which reduces the pro￿ts, and the two e￿ects balance
each other.
In its simplicity, this model can be used for multiple purposes, and in the
next sections we will provide a short overview of those that will be at the core
of the EMSs approach.
7 Business Cycle
The EMSs approach can be used to study business cycles in an environment
where, contrary to the neoclassical approach (Lucas and Rapping, 1969; Kyd-
land and Prescott, 1982) competition in the market is not perfect, and, contrary
to the New-Keynesian approach (Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987), the market
structure is not exogenous. Our characterization of the market structure and of
the incentives to create new ￿rms gives raise to a new mechanism of propagation
of the shocks that has nothing to do with the process of capital accumulation,
with phenomena of intertemporal substitution (of consumption or labor supply)
or with price rigidities, all elements that are absent here. The new mechanism
is entirely driven by the relation between pro￿ts, ￿rm’s value, entry and mark
ups.
To see the mechanisms at work in the simple model of the previous section,
let us re-introduce a variable aggregate productivity At to study the reaction
of the EMSs and of the aggregate variables to exogenous shocks and verify the
business cycle properties of the model. We are mainly interested in temporary
shocks, because permanent ones would simply lead to monotonic convergence to
a new steady state. Therefore, consider a temporary positive shock to At. This
would suddenly increase the productivity and the pro￿ts of the existing ￿rms,
which in turn would increase their stock market value and attract entry. The
temporary increase in the number of ￿rms would strengthen competition so as
to reduce the mark up, enhance production and increase the real wages (while
dampening the impact on the pro￿ts). The proportional allocation of output
between consumption and savings, which are invested in business creation, con-
tributes to spread gradually the e￿ects of the shock over time.
More formally, we can derive the impulse response function of the number
of ￿rms by log-linearizing around the steady state the equation of motion (70).
Taking the logs of both sides, di￿erentiating with respect to the time-varying





~ N ￿ 1 + s
!
^ Nt + ￿N ^ At (74)
=
s(1 ￿ ￿N)
2 AL ￿ (1 ￿ s)￿2
N￿
s(1 ￿ ￿N)AL
^ Nt + ￿N ^ At (75)
where ^ Xt ￿ dXt= ~ X is the percentage distance from the steady state value of a
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The response functions show that a one-shot increase in productivity in-
creases the number of ￿rms on impact. Afterward, even if productivity goes
back to its initial value, the number of ￿rms and output remain above their
steady state values. They gradually decreases over time because of the in-
creased competition and lower mark ups. Notice that the impact of the shock
on the aggregate variables operates through the stock market, which re￿ects
the value of the ￿rms, the incentives to enter in the market and the impact on
competition and on the mark ups. The dynamics of the stock market are due to
the presence of imperfect competition between the ￿rms, which generates large
operative pro￿ts whose expected discounted value is a￿ected by the shocks and
a￿ects the entry process. Under perfect competition (for ￿ ! 0) any additional
propagation mechanism would disappear.
In case of a temporary but persistent technology shock, the e￿ects are much
stronger. The impulse response of the number of ￿rms becomes hump shaped
when the autocorrelation of the shock is high enough, savings are high enough
and the exit rate is low enough. In this case, the shock induces a gradual increase
of the stock market value of the ￿rms and of their number, associated with a
gradual reduction of the mark ups: only after a few periods these variables start
returning toward their initial levels. Nevertheless, the impact on output and
consumption follows closely the behavior of the technology parameter - for this
reason the performance of the model can be improved introducing endogenous
consumption and labor choices.
Analogous e￿ects would derive from temporary shocks to the size of the entry
cost (which could be interpreted as product market reforms for liberalization or
deregulation or as introduction of cost reducing general purpose technologies)
or even to the savings rate (which could be interpreted as demand shocks). A
positive shock to the exit rate could be interpreted as a crisis leading to a chain
of bankruptcies, and would have the consequence of reducing the number of
￿rms and the output level, which would return only gradually to their steady
state levels.
Etro and Colciago (2007) augment this same model with endogenous savings
decision and also with endogenous labor supply: the former will introduce a new
propagation mechanism based on the positive e￿ect of competition on demand
(as we have already seen in our two period partial equilibrium model), the
latter will strengthen the propagation of the shock through a mechanism of
intertemporal substitution of labor supply due to the impact of shocks on real
wages through a general equilibrium e￿ect (already seen in the previous section).
Models with EMSs can be also used to examine policy issues. Bilbiie et
al. (2008a) study ￿scal policy. Bilbiie et al. (2008b), Elkhoury and Mancini
37Gri￿oli (2007) and Lewis (2008) examine monetary policy issues in a framework
augmented with nominal frictions.
8 Trade
A second way to use the EMSs approach is to augment closed economy models
as the one used until now with trade with other countries. When countries open
up, the international EMSs are a￿ected in an interesting way that leads to a
new source of gains from trade. This depends on the reduction of the mark ups
and of the prices, contrary to what happens in the neoclassical approach and
in the new trade theory with monopolistic behavior (Krugman, 1980; Helpman
and Krugman, 1985), in which prices are not a￿ected by trade between identical
countries.
We can use our simple model of business creation to verify the impact of
opening up to trade with another country and evaluate the e￿ect of increasing
the size of the market. Traditional models of intra-industry trade based on mo-
nopolistic behavior of the ￿rms usually emphasize the impact of openness on
the number of varieties produced and traded across countries and determine the
gains from trade on the basis of this variety e￿ect. When strategic interactions
play a role, however, openness has the additional e￿ect of strengthening com-
petition and reducing the mark ups. This phenomenon leads to a reduction of
the international prices which creates a second form of gains from trade.
Imagine that the closed economy considered above opens up to trade with
another identical economy in the absence of trade frictions. Since the size of
the market doubles, the new steady state number of ￿rms from both countries
in the joint market becomes:
~ N + ~ N￿ = 1 + s
￿




The substantial increase in the number of ￿rms strengthens competition and
reduces the global mark up to the following steady state level:
~ ￿ =
2s(1 ￿ ￿N)AL + (1 ￿ s)￿￿N
2s(1 ￿ ￿N)AL ￿ s￿￿N
(77)
which corresponds to an increase in steady state output in both countries.
In conclusion, in this model the gains from trade do not derive from the
variety e￿ect, as in the model of Krugman (1980): this e￿ect is absent here
because goods are homogenous. The gains from trade derive uniquely from the
reduction in the price level. Of course, if we introduce product di￿erentiation
the gains from trade would derive from both sources: lower prices and more
varieties. Notice that these dynamic models can be used to examine the reaction
to shocks in a dynamic open economy framework and to explain a number of
38stylized facts without explanation in the neoclassical approach. Ghironi and
Melitz (2005) have provided a fundamental contribution in this direction.
Another consequence of the reduction in the mark ups is that gross pro￿ts
increase less than proportionally with the increase in the size of the integrated
market, therefore the endogenous number of ￿rms active in each country tends
to decrease. This phenomenon is quite evident in a static environment as the one
considered in the new international trade literature associated with Krugman
(1980). In such a case, globalization generates business destruction due to the
reduction in the global prices. This phenomenon depicts a well known fear
associated with our times (which has induced widespread support to novel forms
of protectionism against globalization).
Etro (2010) examines open economy issues and uses the EMSs approach
to analyze the role of trade policy for globalized markets. Such an analysis is
crucial to understand a world where competition takes place at the global level
and most ￿rms are active in domestic and foreign markets. Most importantly,
our analysis emphasizes a result in sharp contrast with the traditional results.
In particular, contrary to a standard outcome of neoclassical trade policy for
which export taxes are always optimal to improve the terms of trade, the EMSs
approach shows that export subsidies are always the optimal unilateral policy
because they are the only way to provide a strategic advantage to the domestic
￿rms active in international markets where entry is endogenous. This happens
not only in certain markets characterized by Cournot competition as noticed
in the literature on strategic trade policy starting with Brander and Spencer
(1985),19 but under any form of competition including Bertrand competition
(contrary to the celebrated result in Eaton and Grossman, 1986). The optimal
unilateral policy always requires policies that turn domestic exporters into ag-
gressive leaders conquering larger market shares abroad. The result has also
implications for exchange rate policy and R&D policy.
9 Growth
Finally, we can switch our attention to the process of business creation as a
source of growth. As we have seen, our simple model con￿rms that the growth
rate should be declining toward its steady state level (because of the decreasing
marginal incentive to enter), and that only an exogenous growth of total fac-
tor productivity could generate long run growth, exactly as in the neoclassical
approach of Solow (1956). However, endogenous growth can emerge when the
creation of new ￿rms is associated with an increase in total factor productivity.
Long run growth can be seen as the result of externalities in the accumulation
of knowledge, as in Romer (1986). For instance, imagine that the productivity
parameter At increases with the number of ￿rms active in the market because
each one brings new knowledge and experience to the production process with
19See Helpman and Krugman (1989).
39spillovers on the whole sector (possibly thanks to the investment in sunk costs
of production, which could be seen as an investment in R&D). In particular,
assume that At = BNt with B > 0. Then, the equation of accumulation of the
number of ￿rms (70) becomes:
Nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿N)Nt +
s(1 ￿ ￿N)BLN2
t
￿Nt ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ s)
(78)
which implies a process of perpetual business creation in which the growth rate
of Nt converges to a constant and stable steady state level. This process is





which is positive as long as the savings rate is high enough or the rate of exit
is low enough. Notice that, as in the Romer model with externalities in capital
accumulation with growth rate, also here the long run growth rate is increas-
ing in the size of the labor force: scale e￿ects take place here (which implies
that opening up to trade would lead to larger growth rates, rather than larger
output levels). Moreover, the growth rate is increasing in the savings rate and
decreasing in the rate of business destruction and in the size of the costs of
entry.
However, notice that, contrary to the traditional result of the endogenous
growth theory (Romer, 1986), the endogeneity of the market structure gener-
ates a gradual convergence of the growth rate to its long run level, which is
empirically plausible. At the beginning of the growth process the incentives
to create new ￿rms are high and the rate of increase in the number of ￿rms
is high. While ￿rms enter and competition becomes more intense, the rate of
entry decreases and the growth rate of production decreases with it. In the
long run, the growth rate remains constant because the increase in productivity
associated with business creation maintains high the incentives to create new
￿rms. A similar growth process characterized by EMSs in the competition in
the market emerges in the model of Peretto (1996, 1999, 2003).
There is a deeper way in which the creation of new business augments total
factor productivity. As suggested by the recent revival of the Schumpeterian
tradition (Romer, 1990; see Aghion and Howitt, 2009, and Acemoglu, 2009), this
takes place when ￿rms invest not just to create new products, as we assumed
until now, but to create them at a lower cost. Of course, this allows us to increase
total production through innovations, which is the essence of growth driven by
endogenous technological progress. Such a mechanism requires a system of
intellectual property rights which preserves the incentives to undertake R&D
investments with an uncertain return, and its evolution relies on the market
structure of the innovative activity (rather than the market structure of the
productive activity, on which we focused until now). Etro (2004, 2008a) studied
40a model of endogenous growth of this kind analyzing the EMS of the innovative
sector with particular reference to the role of technological leaders and policy
issues.
10 Conclusions
In this survey we have analyzed the EMSs approach to macroeconomics start-
ing from its microfoundations on the supply side. We have ￿rst introduced the
concept of EMSs in a partial equilibrium context built on the basis of the indus-
trial organization literature. Then, we have adopted a demand structure that
derives from the Dixit-Stiglitz utility function and analyzed di￿erent forms of
competition. We have also extended the basic model to a simple two-periods
framework to show a basic mechanism of propagation of the shocks in the pres-
ence of EMSs, and to a general equilibrium framework to show the mechanism
of transmission of a shocks to the labor market. Finally, we have developed a
fully dynamic model inspired by the Solow model but augmented with imper-
fect competition and gradual business creation. This model is the starting point
for a number of macroeconomic applications concerning the theory of business
cycle, the theory of trade and the theory of growth. The aim of this paper was
to provide a simple introduction to the EMSs approach to macroeconomics, and
to support the idea that it is important to introduce in these ￿elds the study
of market structures characterized by strategic interactions between a limited
number of ￿rms and endogenous entry determining this limited number of ￿rms.
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